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Introduction
Recent courage to deviate from standard practice in nonmonotonic reasoning has led to an influx of formalisms. Each achieves nonmonotonicity in a first-order language where entailment is not based on fixed points, nor on model minimization. Most avoid intensional contexts by semantic ascent, 1 thus supplementing the proof theory in the metalanguage. This obviates the need for model-theoretic accounts of new syntax, since there is no new syntax.
Inspiration has come from conditional logics (Nute [9, 10] , Delgrande [1] , Glymour and Thomason [3] ) or inductive logics. In the latter case, both induction's form (Loui [7] , Pollock [12] ) and its effect (Geffner and Pearl [2] , Neufeld [8] ) have been copied. All of the resulting systems incorporate a specificity defeater, analogous to the subclass defeater in inheritance with exceptions (since Touretzky [20] ).
Some of these authors have found use for objects called arguments (also theories). Other systems are based on irrelevance. This paper is concerned with those based on arguments.
Arguments are prima facie proofs that may make use of assertions that one sentence is (defeasible) reason for another. They indicate support for a proposition, but do not establish warrant once and for all; it matters what other counterarguments there may be. Arguments may have stucture (Loui [7] , Pollock [12] ) or may just be collections of supporting sentences (Poole [14] , Geffner and Pearl [2] ). There is widespread agreement that arguments in these systems generalize paths in inheritance systems.;
As is the case in inheritance, there is a "clash of intuitions" that has resulted in a plethora of theories. There are at present few ways of classifying the systems. Our intent, in defining yet another system, is not to add to the inventory. In fact, this paper attempts to bring together the prominent systems based on arguments. A system is defined that takes its form from Loui (which in turn evolved from that of Kyburg [6] ) and which combines the rules of Poole and of Pollock. For most of the AI audience, this will effectively condense three systems into one, remedying deficiencies of each.
More importantly, this system is defined in a mathematically more rigorous manner. Past definitions (especially Poole's and Loui's) did not have the precision nor the completeness to serve as a foundation for future mathematical work. It is no accident that the statement of the system here allows concise proof of nontrivial properties.
Poole and Pollock combined
Poole treats specificity, i.e., a comparative measure of the relevance of information, in an elegant and usable way, but does not describe adequately when to apply his specificity comparator to interactions among arguments. On the other hand, Pollock treats the interaction among arguments properly while rejecting specificity. Pollock rejects specificity both as a generalization of the subclass defeater and as a useful shorthand. This places him in an extreme minority in the defeasible reasoning community.
In our view, Poole and Pollock fail to develop the best ideas in their systems to produce a system of lasting usefulness to the knowledge representation General discussion during the Workshop on Defeasible Reasoning with Specificity and Multiple Inheritance, St. Louis, MO (1989) . community. Poole [13] has implemented a system of defeasible reasoning which does not address interactions among arguments. Pollock has taken his research in a direction which is too general for AI's uses.
The system defined here combines the ideas of the two. But the main contribution of this paper is a precise, well-defined system which exhibits a correct behavior when applied to the benchmark examples in the literature. 3 We take the knowledge of agent a to be divided into a set of defeasible rules zl and a set of well-formed formulas (wffs) 2[ in the standard formal logic sense. The set Y{ is further divided into (1) grounded wffs: the contingent part of Y{; and (2) ungrounded wffs, the necessary part of 2[. Evidence suggests new tentative conclusions; a potential conclusion p will be suggested when it is consistent with 2{ and has a supporting subset of za which, in conjunction with Y{, can derive p without deriving a contradiction at the same time. Accepting or rejecting p is a matter of comparing arguments supporting p, their counterarguments, their rebuttals, and so on. p must be consistent with 2/, but its interaction with subsets of A could be more interesting. If a subset S of A supports p, we will say that there exists a defeasible derivation of p from S. The subsets form argument structures, and are ordered according to Poole.
Poole claims his specificity relation is based on Popperian ideas, but some find it unintuitive or lacking justification. We view it as a convention: arguably, the most useful convention to date. It is based on the four-part observation that (1) two conflicting arguments were made; (2) sometimes one argument can be made while the other cannot; (3) the reverse is not true; (4) thus, one argument is more particular about the current evidence than the other; it is more specific.
Extrapolating from the total evidence requirement of inductive logic, being more particular about the evidence makes an argument stronger. Another way to rationalize the rule is pragmatic: if the more specific argument does not defeat the less specific, then it is never an effective argument, since the less specific argument can always be made as a counterargument whenever the first argument can be made. This is unacceptable for representing knowledge. Pollock's method of defining which arguments survive counterargument and actually justify their conclusions is appealing. Essentially, it propagates defeat from arguments that have no defeaters, and it could be defined in any of a number of ways. We retain Pollock's original inductive step to recognize his contribution, but the rule could be expressed as TMS-like labeling, or as AND-OR graph evaluation. We have two kinds of labels while Pollock has only one: this is a purely technical variation on Pollock that we introduce because defeat is implicit in this theory, while it is explicit in Pollock's. It is the implicit defeat arising from comparison of specificity that makes the hybrid system attractive for actual use.
Arguments and specificity
We will construct a formal system fl_ with the objective of providing a language in which to represent the knowledge of a given agent a and in which to perform defeasible reasoning.
The language of ~_ is composed of a first-order language LP, plus a binary metalinguistic relation among members of 2£. Any axiomatization of ~ will do for our purposes, and we will use the standard connectives and punctuation symbols freely without explicitly introducing them. We assume that the rules of inference attached to the axiomatization are modus ponens and generalization. The members of the metalinguistic relation are called defeasible rules and they have the form a >-/3, where a and/3 are well-formed formulas (w):s) in L¢, which must contain free variables, e.g., they are nonclosed wffs. The relation ">-" among L£'s wffs is understood as expressing that "reasons to believe in the antecedent a provide reasons to believe in the consequent/3". Variables with the same name on both sides of the rule are assumed to be the same. An
instance of an open defeasible rule is obtained by replacing all the flee variables by appropriate constants. When no confusion is possible we will use the term defeasible rule to refer to the open defeasible rule and to its grounded instances.
The set Sent(~) of sentences of ~, that is the set of closed well-formed formulas in ~, can be partitioned in two subsets, corresponding to necessary and contingent information. Necessary information is the context in which defeasible rules are provided. Although a purely syntactic distinction might not be possible on philosophical grounds, we normally take sentences with variables or implication to be necessary. Thus, the first subset contains the grounded sentences Sentc(~ ) and the second subset contains nongrounded sentences SentN(Sg), i.e.,
Sent(~) = Sentc(3f ) U SentN(~ ) .
Obviously,
Sentc(5£ ) fq Sent~(~) = 0.
The names used for the subsets reflect the view that the grounded sentences in Sentc(S£ ) represent information depending on the individual constants of the language. Those individual constants are contingent to the reality being represented. On the other hand, the sentences in SentN(Sf ) are wffs containing variables. That characteristic allows them to convey properties that single out a class of worlds, i.e., worlds where the relations among individuals are the same regardless of the local individuals. We choose to call these sentences the necessary facts, because without them the world would not be as it is.
The knowledge of a is represented in IL by a pair (~(, A), where ~( is a subset of Sent(~), and A is a finite set of defeasible rules. The pair (Y{, A) will be called a defeasible logic structure. Y{ represents the indefeasible part of a's knowledge and A represents tentative information, i.e., information that a is prepared to take at less than face value. In mapping a's reality to a subset ~ of we obtain a partition of ~ in two subsets
Clearly, 9f = ~y U Y{c. The only condition on ~ is consistency, i.e., 2~ ~-±. Sometimes, when using ~r, we will refer to it as the context, and ~r will be considered as a set of wffs or as the conjunction of them depending on the situation. Having defined our knowledge representation language we need to introduce a notion of entailment, or inference, which is somewhat different from the one used in first-order languages. That is, given a defeasible logic structure (Y{, zl), we need to define what other facts can be sanctioned as justified. Our formal system introduces this notion in a way that is not axiomatic. For a complete definition we need further develop our formalism. We will present the syntactic part here. The rest will be introduced in the next sections.
Given a member A of Sent(~), and set F = {A 1, A 2, ..., An}, where each A i is a member of ~ or a grounded instance of a member of za, we will establish a meta-meta-relationship "~--", called defeasible consequence, between F and A in the following way. A well-formed formula A will be called a defeasible consequence of the set F as described above, if and only if there exists a sequence B1,..., B,, such that A = Bm and, for each i, either B e is an axiom of ~ or B i is in F, or B i is a direct consequence of the preceding members of the sequence using modus ponens or instantiation of a universally quantified sentence. The grounded instances of the defeasible rules are regarded as material implications for the application of modus ponens. 4 The sequence B~ ..... B m will be called a defeasible derivation or just a derivation. We use F F-A as an abbreviation of A is a defeasible consequence of F. If necessary, in order to avoid confusion with the context, we write F F'~ A. We also will write A t ..... A~A instead of {A 1 ..... A~}~A, and ~U T ~ A, making explicit the distinction between the context ~{ and a set T of defeasible rules used in the derivation.
In first-order logic the above definition is enough to describe the wffs that are theorems of F, but for us the situation is different because we need to introduce the tentative nature of the conclusions, e.g., we need to give a criterion that will allow us to prefer one conclusion over another. That criterion will be the specificity relation among arguments. We will now introduce the formal notion of arguments and later we will define the specificity relation among those formal objects.
Arguments
Derivations, as defined above, make use of some grounded instances of defeasible rules from a. The set of grounded defeasible rules characterize the derivation and we will give the name argument basis to that set. In order to facilitate the following discussion we introduce the set /1 ~ of all grounded instances of members of A produced by using the individual constants in 5~. (1) ~{U T?h, (2) u T The pair ( T, h ) :~r will be called an argument structure.
Remark 2.2. When possible we will drop the reference to the context and we will write (T, h) meaning (T, h)~. We will refer to the collection of all possible argument structures as AStrue(A ~) or just AStruc. There is a distinguished argument, (0, ~), for any context Y{ with finitely representable closure; i.e., no rules are necessary to support the conjunction of the atoms of the deductive closure (Y{~) of the knowledge in 5f. Finally, for (T, h) we will assume that the set T is minimal, or nonredundant in the sense that it does not contain any rule that is unnecessary for the inference of h. This is a sort of "Occam's razor" principle for arguments. Sometimes it will be necessary to talk about the defeasible rules in terms of their antecedents and consequents. The following definitions introduce three operators for this purpose.
Definition 2.8. Let T be a finite subset of A ~. We will introduce two operators over sets of defeasible rules. They are the operator An(.), which applied to T will return the set of antecedents of its rules, and Co(.), which applied to T will return the set of consequents of its rules. Sentc(~ ) is normally restricted to conjunctions from An(A ~ ).
Example 2.9. Given the argument
It is also useful to have access to the set of literals used in the defeasible rules of an argument structure. 
Specificity
Having defined these objects we would like to establish certain binary relations on AStrue(A *) in such a way that it would help us to choose the "better" argument structure that supports a conclusion. The following definitions, essentially Poole's [14] , will characterize this relation. Definition 2.12. Given two argument structures (T~,h~) and (T2, ha) in AStrue, we say that T~ for h~ is strictly more specific than T 2 for h 2 denoted by (Tt, hi) >spec (T2, h2), if and only if:
(1) VeE Sentc(~g ) such that 5( N U (e) U T~ ~ h~ and 9{ N U {e} ~ h~ also Y{y U {e} U T 2 ~ h2, and (2) 3e E Sentc(~ ) such that:
YdN tO {e} ~-h 2 (nontriviality condition).
Remark 2.13. The term activates appearing in the definition is used with the following meaning: together with Y(N the argument T is enough to construct a defeasible derivation of h.
Another important relation among argument structures is the notion of being equally specific. Definition 2.14. Two argument structures T~ for h 1 and T 2 for h 2 are equispecific, denoted by
when the following condition holds,
Ve E Sentc(~ ) ,

ST{ N U {e} U T 1 ~ h~ if and only if 5r~ N U {e} U T 2 ~ h 2 .
Finally the combination of both notions gives the following definition. Definition 2.15. We say that an argument structure T 1 for h I is at least as specific as an argument structure T 2 for h 2 denoted by <T,, h,> ->spec <T2, h2), if and only if <T e, h2) "~'~spec <T1, h,) or <T,, h,) >sp¢¢ <T2, he). Some examples will clarify the concept.
Example 2.16. The argument structure <{A(r) ^ B(r) >-C(r)}, C(r)> is more specific than ({A(r)>--7 C(r)},-7 C(r)) because every time the first argument can be activated to support C(r) the second also supports --1C. But, on the other hand, A(r) alone can activate the second argument structure but does not activate the first. So
Example 2.17. The argument structure <{A(r) >--~C(r)},-aC(r)> is more specific than the argument structure ({A(r)>--n(r), B(r)>-C(r)}, C(r)> because every time the first argument can support --1C(r) the second also supports C(r). But, on the other hand, B(r) alone can activate the second argument structure but does not activate the first. So
Remark 2.18. Whenever no confusion is possible we will drop the subscript "spec" in the symbols "> .... > " and "~ " writing instead ">", ">" spec ~ --spec ~ spec and "~".
An argument and its subarguments are related by the specificity relation in a natural, expected way.
Lemma 2.19. Let < T, h) be an argument structure and < S, j> a subargument of ( T, h > . Then < T, h> is more specific than < S, j > , i.e., < T, h) >-( S, ]>.
The equi-specificity "~" relation decomposes AStruc into disjunct subsets of equi-specific arguments, i.e., establishes a partition on it. This porperty is better expressed in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.20. The equi-specificity relation among members of AStruc is an equivalence relation.
The "~" equivalence relation will help us to introduce an order relation in the set AStruc/~, i.e., the quotient set of AStruc by the equivalence relation "=". This order relation is induced by "_>". First, we observe that >_ defines a quasi-ordering in AStruc, i.e., the relation is reflexive and transitive. If we lift the relation to the quotient set AStruc/= of the equivalence classes defined by "~'" in AStruc the new relation will define a partial order over those classes, as is shown in the lemma below. 
[(T,, h,)] 2[(T 2, h2) ] if and only if (T,, hi) ~ (T2, h2).
Again, whenever possible we will drop the "spec" subscript from "-~spec" writing "_2".5
The introduction of the > relation of AStrue has the objective of providing a way to select the most "appropriate" argument structure. In that sense the following lemma establishes the fundamental property regarding order in AStruc/=.
Lemma 2.23. The relation 2_ defined in AStruc/~ is a partial order.
The next lemma defines a reduced search space for checking specificity. (
Proof.
(1) implies (2) . Assume that (T~, h~) >_ (T 2, h2). Hence, (T 1, hi) is at least as specific as any subargument of (T2, h:). There is always a subargumerit, S, of (T2, h2) for any x in An(T2) (by the nonredundant property of
(T z, h2) ). (T~, h 1 ) >_ (S, x). Since An(T~) activates T~ for hi, it activates S for x. Therefore, ~[N U An(T1) U T 2 ~ x for all xE An(T2).
(2) implies (1). Assume that e in Sentc(Sf ) is such that 3'[ N tO {e} to TI ~--h~.
We want to show that Y{~ U {e} tO T z ~ h 2. Because of the quantification in 
that ( TI, hi) >_ { T2, h2). Let
5 As noted by a referee, we do not state the theorem that given (T1, hl)~-(T2, h2) and ( T I, h I ) > ( T 3, h3), also ( 7"2, h2) >_ ( 7"3, h3) , but this is immediate from the definitions.
* At press time, this lemma and its proof are found to be in error. A corrigendum is planned by the authors.
(T2, h2) be such that Vx~ Co(T2), YdU Tl~-x. If (T2, h2) contains a subargument structure (R, p), then (T 1, h~ ) contains a subargument structure (S, p) such that (S, p) > (R, p).
Proof. The subargument structure (R, p) of ( T2, h 2) is formed by the subset R of T:. Given that every member in Co(T2) can be inferred using the rules in T~ and Yt, we can distinguish which rules are necessary to prove the subset Co(R) of Co(T2), calling it S. We contend that (S, p) is the required subargument. Obviously, for all x in Co(R), Y{ U S ~-x, by its own definition.
Therefore, any literal necessary to infer p from R is available in S. For the same reason (S, p) _> (R, p). [] This establishes conditions for discarding arguments which reduces the search for argument defeaters.
Remark 2.26. Given two arguments (Tl,hl) and (T2, h2) satisfying the conditions of the above lemma, we will say that (T 1, h 1 ) covers (T 2, h2).
An algebra of arguments
A very good question regarding arguments is about the kind of operations that it is possible to define on them. We will devote the next few sections to consider certain operations on ~((T, h))= {(T i, hi)))i~ 1 the family of subarguments of an arbitrary argument structure ( T, h) E AStruc, where I is a set of indices, and explore some of its properties and interrelations. When no confusion is possible we will use ~ instead of ,~(( T, h )).
A set of wffs in a first-order language is consistent if and only if there is no formula for which that formula and its negation are theorems of the set. Our defeasible derivation relation is weaker than derivation in first-order logic. It is possible to defeasibly derive contradictory conclusions from an arbitrary set of defeasible rules. Because of that characteristic we will introduce a weaker notion for sets of defeasible rules.
The following discussion omits proofs which can be found in the thesis [17] .
Definition 3.1. Given two argument structures (T 1, hi) and (T2, h2) in AStruc they will be called concordant if Y{ U T~ U T 2 ~-±.
As could be expected, subarguments of a given argument structure have the property of being concordant with each other. 
Argument combination (join)
Definition 3.3. Let { T, h } ~ AStruc be an arbitrary argument structure, and let be the family of all its subargument structures. Given { T1, h ~ ) and { T 2, h~) in ,~, we define the combination of them as the argument structure ( T3, h3), where T 3 = T~ U T 2 and h 3 = h~ /x h 2. The operation will be denoted: {T3, h3) = (T,, h,) kl (T 2, h2}. is an identity element with respect to the combining operation in the family 0% of subargument structures of a given argument structure ( T, h }.
Argument intersection (meet)
Given a subset T of A +, we will describe the rules on it as {A i >--Bi}~e t. Using that representation we can consider the set {Ai}i~ 1 of antecedents of rules in T and the set {Bi}iE t of consequents of those rules. If (T, h} is an argument structure for h, then the set (~" t/{B~}~Et) ~ is the set of literals for which there is a subargument structure contained in ( T, h ). Let T be an arbitrary, but consistent, subset of A 4. The question is "Is there a literal in ~ for which we can have an argument structure using T?" The literal (Y{ tO {B~}i~t) ~ has that property. It also has the property of being the strongest literal, in the usual sense, with that property. Definition 3.12. Let (T, h) E AStruc be an arbitrary argument structure, and let ~ be the family of all its subargument structures. Given (T~, h~) and (T2, h2) in ~, we define the intersection of them as the argument structure (Ta, h3), where T3= Tlfq T 2 and h 3 is defined as (Y{U{Bi}ielf, where {Bi}ic I is the set of consequents of the rules in ~. The operation will be denoted: , h2} fq (r 3, h3) ) . 
Justifications
In the previous section we introduced the notion of argument structure and defined a specificity relationship on the set of all possible argument structures. The reason to define that relationship is to be able to "select" argument structures with the characteristic of being "better" than others. In this section we will define the selection process.
Basic interactions among argument structures
Arguments are objects that represent "pieces" of the reasoning process. They relate to each other in different ways. We have already seen an example in the subargument relation. Another example is the concordance among argument structures, i.e., the property which would allow to join them without producing an inconsistency. Going in the opposite direction is the disagreement relation that will be introduced in the next subsection. Some other interactions involving specificity are possible. We will introduce them now starting with those that are simplest to define.
Disagreement
It is possible for two argument structures to support two facts which together with the context Y{ are inconsistent, We will refer to the relationship between two argument structures in that situation as disagreement. Next we will present the formal definition of disagreement. 
({E>----7C},--7C)~'<3x'({A>--X},X), :K={E,A, XDC}.
The following is not an example of this relationship, but motivates the next definition. 
((E>----TB},-1B),({E>---B,B>---A},A),
Y[={E}.
Counterargument
The counterargument relation tells us about the internal construction of an argument structure with reference to another argument structure. It is a refinement of the disagreement relation. It looks to the subarguments of a given argument structure in light of another argument, i.e., indicates the existence of subarguments of an argument structure which are in disagreement with the other argument. Formally: Definition 4.5. We say that an argument structure T 1 for h~ counterargues an argument structure T z for h z at h, denoted by 
Defeat
The defeat relationship is a further refinement of counterargument, where the specificity relation comes into play. We will say that an argument structure (T~,h~) defeats another argument structure (T 2, h2) if it is the case that (T2, h2) contains a subargument structure (T, h) such that (T~, h~ ) disagrees with ( T, h), and ( T~, h I ) is more specific than ( T, h ). That is:
Definition 4.8. We say that an argument structure T~ for h~ defeats an argument structure T 2 for h 2, denoted by
( Tl, hl) >> def ( T2, h2}
if and only if there exists a subargument structure (T, h) of (T 2, h2} such that:
(1) ( T 1, h~ ) ~___~h ( T2 ' h2), i.e., T 1 for h 1 counterargues T 2 for h 2 at h, and (2) ( T 1, h~) > (T, h), i.e., T~ for h I is more specific than T for h. 
Justifying arguments
A fundamental issue in reasoning is to decide what the agent believes as a function of a given context and the set of defeasible rules forming his explicit knowledge. But how can he decide if a tentative conclusion is part of the implicit knowledge? Or how can he decide if that tentative conclusion is consistent with the implicit knowledge? According to our scheme this decision must be taken by analyzing what kind of support the tentative conclusion has. This can be accomplished by seeing which arguments are relevant to the conclusion.
Given a fact h, there may be several argument structures in the set AStrue(A ~) of argument structures formed with members of A ~, which support h from the context K. Those argument structures relate to others in AStruc(A ~) by the defeat and counterargument relations. For an argument structure (T, h ) in AStrue(a ~), we may have a set I of argument structures which interfere with (T, h), i.e., they counterargue (T, h). In I, the set of interfering arguments, there may be some arguments which defeat (T, h).
Those defeaters could in turn be defeated. If all the defeaters are defeated, the original argument structure (T, h) becomes reinstated. The above discussion leads to an inductive definition, which is similar to Pollock's [12] and characterizes that process.
Definition 4.11. Arguments are active at various levels as supporting or interfering arguments.
(1) All arguments are (level-0) S-arguments (supporting arguments) and
I-arguments (interfering arguments). (2) An argument (T1, hi) is a (level-(n + 1)) S-argument if and only if
there is no level-n I-argument ( T2, h 2) such that for some h, (/'2, h 2) counterargues (T1, hi) at h, i.e., ji/(T2, h2) EAStrue such that, for some h, (T2, h2)~-->h (Tl,h~). Remark 4.12. A level-n S-argument will be denoted by Sn-argument and a level-n I-argument will be denoted by In-argument. Also notice that we dropped the parentheses.
Definition 4.13, We say that an argument (T, h) in AStruc justifies h if and only if there exists m such that, for all n ~> m, ( T, h) is an Sn-argument for h.
We say that h is justified in 12 C AStruc if there is a ( T, h ) E I2 that justifies h.
Lenuna 4.14. Let ( T, h) be an argument structure in AStrue, such that ( T, h) justifies h. Then every subargument ( R, q) of ( T, h ) justifies its conclusion q.
Proof. The proof comes from the fact that any possible defeater of (R, q) will also be a
defeater for (T, h). And since (T, h) justifies h, no effective defeater exists. []
We say that h is provisionally justified at level n iff there exists an S nargument which supports it. A set of provisionally justified facts is called stable iff every member of it is justified.
It is possible to define a sequence {Xn} of operators over AStruc in correspondence with Definition 4.11 in the following way. For a given k, let 2~ k(AStruc) be the set of h such that there exists ( T, h) that is in AStrue and is an Sk-argument; i.e., ,vk produces the set of partially justified facts at level k. This definition allows us to talk about the set of justified facts in operational terms, as in the following lemmas. Proof. The proof of this lemma is obvious from the definition of stable set. Once ~" has "repeated" itself, i.e., ~ ~(AStruc) = ~" +l(AStruc), that means that no new interfering argument has been reinstated. Therefore, no I"-argument can get defeated at level n + 1 and no S"-argument can get counterargued Proof (Sketch). The set AStruc/~, as we have shown previously is partially ordered by "_~". Consider the set ~(AStruc/~) of all the subsets of AStruc/~. Some of their members are totally ordered sets, i.e., chains. These chains are formed by equivalence classes which contain equi-specific arguments. But even though two arguments are equi-specific they may support different facts. Nevertheless, from one of the chains in ~(AStruc/~) we can extract chains of arguments which support the same fact. Being finite, from those chains it is possible to extract the most specific argument for every fact. We collect all the most specific arguments in a set that for reference convenience we will call 9-(AStruc). Notice here that we may have in 3-(AStruc) more of one argument for a fact, but if that case occurs the argument structures are unrelated by ">_".
We apply the justification procedure of Definition 4.13 to J-(AStruc), and this is equivalent to applying it to AStruc, as is clear from the following discussion. It is obvious that we have lost no interesting argument by restricting ourselves to 3-(AStruc). For every argument structure in AStruc, there is an argument structure in g/-(AStruc) which is at least as specific as the one in AStruc. So in looking for counterarguments of an argument structure we will obtain the same counterargument points. The same is true for defeaters, with the difference that now we only have to look at the more specific argument structures possible for a defeater point. Now, given one of these arguments in J-(AStruc), ( T, h), we consider the set
Counter(( T, h) ) of counterarguments of ( T, h) in ~-(AStruc). Obviously the set can be empty. The set Counter(( T, h)) contains only the more specific counterarguments for every possible counterargument point of (T, h). For every member (R, q) in Counter(( T, h)) there is a set of possible defeaters
Defeaters((R, q)) which contains only defeater arguments which are more specific than (R, q); again the set can be empty. Defeaters ((R, q)) contains only the more specific defeaters (S, r) for every possible defeater point of (R, q). This construction can be performed until we get a "tree" where the nodes of the tree are connected by the "counterargument" relation, the root to its children, or the "defeat" relation between the rest of the levels. This tree contains the whole dialectical structure for the argument being considered.
We define an argument line as the walk that it is possible to construct from one of the leaf nodes of the tree to the first node before the root, i.e., the last node in an argument line is a counterargument. We can apply the second operation defined in the justification procedure to the set of argument lines obtained from the tree. If an argument line "survives" the test the argument is defeated.
These argument lines are sequences (( T l, h 1), ( T2, h2) , . . . , ( T,, h~) ) where (Tl,hl) is the counterargument. The sequence is ordered by the specificity relation, i.e., (Tn, hn) >-.. > (T 2, h2) > (T1, hi). If n is odd, the counterargument survives; if n is even, the counterargument is defeated as is easy to see. [] Definition 4.17. We will refer to the stable set defined by Theorem 4.16 as ,~=.
Discarding arguments
In this section we will show some relationships among arguments and justifications aiming to find avenues pointing to efficient implementations. In that direction, it is importa'~t to find properties that will characterize arguments that can be discarded in order to reduce the size of the search space. Again, proofs are omitted.
We prove propositions essential to proving the claim that covered arguments can be discarded. This is a weak pruning method, and serious investigation of pruning will have to look at stronger claims. But our interest here is how the formalism allows provable claims. 12U{(Tl,hl) ), where 12 is any subset of AStrue.
Lemma 5.1. Given two argument structures (TI, h 1 ) and (T 2, h2) in AStruc such that ( T 1, hi) >_ (T2, h2) and Yd U {hi} ~ { h2}, then ( T 1, h2) is an argument structure. That is, T 1 is an argument for h 2, and ( T~, h2) >_ ( T 2, h2), i.e. T 1 for h 2 is more specific than T z for h 2.
Lemma 5.2. Given two argument structures ( T 1, hi) and ( Tz, h2) such that (Tl,hl)>_(T2, h2) and ~t.J{h~}~-{h2}, if h 2 is justified in 12U {(T~,h~), (T2, h2) } then h 2 is justified in
Lemma 5.3. Given two argument structures ( T i, hi) and (T 2, h2) such that ( Tl, hl) covers ( T2, h2), i.e., ( Tl, hl) >_ ( T2, h2) and Yf t3 Tl ~ x, for all x in Co(T2), then if p is justified in 12 U {( T 1 , hi), ( T 2, h2) }, p is also justified in 12 t_l { ( T1, h 1 ) }, where 12 is any subset of AStruc. ( T,, h, ) covers ( T 2, h2), then if ( T 2, h2) contains a subargument structure (R, p) such that (n, p)@-~P (r, h), then (T l, h,) contains a subargument structure ( S, p) such that ( S, p ) ~---~ P ( r, h ) .
This allows covered arguments to be discarded while keeping the arguments that cover them, with no loss in ability to counterargue. Proposition 5.5. Given (T 1, h~) , (T 2, 
h2), and (T, h) in AStruc such that (T~,h~) covers (T2, h2), then if (T2, h2)>>def(T,h) then (Tl,hl)'>de f (T,h).
This allows covered arguments to be discarded while keeping the arguments that cover them, with no loss in ability to defeat. 
If (T, h) is an S"-argument in •big, then (T, h) is an S~-argument in Os~au.
This is the inductive step toward completing the argument that covered arguments can be discarded if at least one of their covers is retained. The supporting arguments are not disrupted by discarding a covered argument.
Some interesting examples
We will show some examples presented in the literature of defeasible reasoning to show the behavior of the system. 
(B(x) >--F(x)) , (P(x) >--7F(x)) , (P(*) ~ B(x)) , (P(opus)) , (F(opus)?).
The context and defeasible rule set are 
= {P(opus), P(opus) D B(opus)},
z = (B(opus) >-p(opus), P(opus) >-F(opus)}
respectively (see Fig. 1 ). Two argument structures are interesting:
( TI, F(opus)) = ({B(opus) >--F(opus)}, F(opus)>, ( T 2, mF(opus) > = ( { P(opus) >--7F(opus)}, -TF(opus) ) .
We have the following disagreement
( T1, F(opus)) D<~ x ( T2, 7 F(opus)>.
Moreover ( 7"2, -7F(opus)) ~_.~F(opus) ( T,, V(opus)>.
But ( T2, -7 F(opus)) > ( T1, F(opus)>.
Therefore,
( T2, "-7F(opus)> >>de, ( T1, F(opus)>, hence ( Tz, -7F(opus) > justifies -7F(opus).
Example 6.2 (Nixon Diamond). This canonical example is devised to show how the reasoner behaves in ambiguous situations and is due to Reiter [15] .
Quakers tend to be pacifist Republicans tend to be non-pacifist Nixon is a quaker Nixon is a republican Is Nixon pacifist?
(Q(x) >--P(x)), (R(x) >---1P(x)), (Q(nix)) , (R(nix)) , (P(nix)?) .
Clearly, there are three possible behaviors. The first, which is clearly undesirable, will give one of the two possibilities arbitrarily. The second, which is the behavior of reasoners using the inferential distance ordering instead of length of the path [20] , will give two answers, leaving the decision to whomever uses the system. This kind of reasoner is called credulous because it gives good standing to all the possible conclusions. The last, the so-called skeptical reasoner, does not decide about ambiguity [5] by not giving any answer. Our reasoner is skeptical. The context and defeasible rule set are
~{ = {R(nix), Q(nix)} , A = {Q(nix) >-P(nix), R(nix) >---aP(nix)}
respectively (see Fig. 2 ). We have two argument structures, one for P(nix) and one for 7P(nix), namely,
( T,, P(nix)> = ({Q(nix) >--P(nix)}, P(nix)) , < T2,-TP(nix)) = ({R(nix)) >----TP(nix)}, ~P(nix)).
None of those argument structures defeats the other; they interfere and they are not ordered by specificity.
Example 6.3 (Cascaded Ambiguities). This example is an extension of the
Nixon Diamond constructed to show how simple-minded skeptical reasoners can be fooled to believe in the militarism (non-anti-militarism) of Nixon [5] .
Quakers tend to be pacifist Republicans tend to be non-pacifist
Pacifists tend to be anti-military
Republicans tend to be football fans
Football fans tend to be non-anti-military Nixon is a quaker
Nixon is a republican Is Nixon anti-military?
The context and defeasible rule set are
Y{ = { R(nix), Q(nix) } , A = {Q(nix) >-P(nix), R(nix) >-7P(nix), P(nix) >-A(nix), R(nix) >-F(nix), F(nix) >-7A(nix) } .
respectively (see Fig. 3 ). We have two argument structures, one for A(nix) and one for ~A(nix), namely,
( T,, A(nix) ) = ( { Q(nix)>--P(nix), P(nix)>-A(nix)}, A(nix) ) , ( T2, -TA(nix)) = ({R(nix) >-F(nix), F(nix) >-7A(nix)}, 7A(nix) ) .
Neither of those argument structures defeats the other and our reasoner remains skeptical.
Notice that some skeptical reasoners will consider the "path" (using inheri-
tance reasoners terminology), { Q(nix) >--P(nix), P(nix) >-A(nix) } as being preempted by {R(nix) >-~P(nix)} and hence leaving {R(nix) >-F(nix), F(nix) >---TA(nix)} free to support the conclusion about Nixon being non-
anti-military. That situation does not arise in our case. The argument structure
( {R(nix) >--~P(nix)}, 7P(nix)> counterargues ( T 1, A(nix)) at P(nix), but ({R(nix)>-TP(nix)},TP(nix)) is not more specific than (T,,A(nix)).
Therefore, ( { R(nix) >--7P(nix)}, 7P(nix) > does not defeat ( TI, A(nix) >.
Anti 
Example 6.4 (Royal African Elephants).
This example deals with "on-path versus off-path preemption" and is due to Sandewall [16] , in the context of inheritance reasoners.
Elephants tend to be gray
Royal elephants tend to be non-gray
Royal elephants are elephants
African elephants are elephants
Clyde is a Royal elephant Clyde is an African elephant
Is Clyde non-gray?
The context and defeasible rules are
~{ = { R(clyde), A(clyde), R(clyde) ~ E(clyde), A(clyde) D E(clyde) } , a = { E(clyde) >--G(clyde), R(clyde) >----7 G(clyde)}
respectively (see Fig. 4 ). We have three argument structures, two for G(clyde) and one for -7 G(clyde), namely,
( Zl, G(clyde) ) = ( { E(clyde) >--G(clyde)}, G(clyde) ) , ( T2, G(clyde) ) = ( { E(clyde) >--G(clyde) }, G(clyde) ) , ( T 3, --7 G(clyde)) = ( { R(clyde) >--"-7 G(clyde) ), --1 G(clyde)).
Clearly, the more specific argument structure is (T3,---1G(clyde)), matching our intuitions.
Example 6.5 (Adult University Students). This example deals with "defeasible specificity", which our system does not have, and is due to Geffner [2] . Geffner will draw a conclusion here, while we will not.
Adults tend to work (A(x) >--W(x)), University students tend not to work (U(x) >--~W(x)),
UniversityStudent(x) >--Adult(x), but not UniversityStudent(K) }-Adult(K). University students tend to be adults
Ken is a university student
Ken is an adult Does Ken not work?
The arguments are depicted in Fig. 5 . Although U(x) >-A(x), this cannot be a part of either argument (first because it makes each argument nonminimal, and moreover, because it causes inconsistency in the second argument), so there is no specificity. Had the evidential context been only that Ken is a university student, from which A(K) is derived, then the second argument would have been more specific.
Example 6.6 (Prima Facie Inconsistency of Rules). This example deals with
rules that are not "epsilon-sound" in the sense of Geffner and Pearl [2] . Their system cannot entertain such rules, while ours simply draws no conclusion.
(P>-Q), (P>--TR), (Q>-R),
(P), (R or ~R)?.
The arguments are depicted in Fig. 6 Fig. 7 ). They note that Poole's original system can choose the second argument over the first argument, but complain that it cannot block the first argument once extended.
Blocking the extended argument, as desired, is trivial in this system. This was also true of the system in [7] . Moreover, the present system permits the second argument to defeat the first even when the final rule is replaced by a material conditional.
Aliveness tends to persist
Loadedness tends to persist
Firing a loaded gun coerces a change in Aliveness Fred is Alive
The gun is loaded
The gun is fired and the evidence Raining@3 just produces a theory that is defeated by the counterargument T 2 (or T2b ).
A justification finder
Implementations of defeasible reasoners are rarely seen beasts. An early attempt to introduce defeasible reasoning programming with specificity was Nute's d-Prolog [10, 11] . The language of d-Prolog provides facilities to define absolute rules, "every bat is a mammal", defeasible, rules, "birds fly", and defeater rules, "sick birds do not fly". The purpose of defeater rules was to account for the exceptions to defeasible rules. For instance, given the defeasible rule "birds fly", the defeater rule "sick birds do not fly" will stop us from concluding that "Tweety flies", in the presence of the fact "Tweety is a sick bird".
The language implemented
The basic ideas of logic programming are introduced here using the standard notation for them. We will slightly modify that notation as we introduce our language. It is customary to regard all clauses as implications, even though they have no head or body. We will alter this for our language in a way that is consistent with this presentation. The reasons for that modification will be given below. A unit clause is a clause of the form:
B( , i.e., a definite clause with an empty body. We will alter this representation introducing the special atom true. Our unit clauses will be written:
Unit clauses are also called facts.
Definition 7.3. A Horn clause is a clause which is either a definite clause or a definite goal.
We have extended the representation in two ways. First, we added defeasible clauses, and second, we introduced a relation neg used to represent negative facts. The neg relation will allow the representation of negative facts in the system. Negation is handled in the same way as proposed by Nute [10, 11] . This relation is not related in any way to negation as failure and its only meaning is to refer to a negative fact. Negative facts relate to positive facts in the usual way. The system will treat the relation neg as a prefix forming part of the "name" of the atom and not as an operator. The system will recognize that neg neg A = A. That is, the goal neg A will be assumed as a consequence of a set R of definite and defeasible clauses if and only if neg A is deducible from R via a finite number of applications of modus ponens. The goal neg neg A will be assumed as a consequence of a set R of definite and defeasible clauses if and only if neg neg A, or A, is deducible from R via a finite number of applications of modus ponens. Thus, the relation neg does not have any special status; the system will treat the atom neg A in the same way as any other atom C.
Our neg operator can appear in the head of the rules, defeasible and otherwise. For instance, Definition 7.5. A knowledge base K is a finite set of definite clauses and defeasible clauses, possibly containing atoms affected by the neg relation. A knowledge base is the equivalent of what previously was called a defeasible logic structure. In a knowledge base ~ the set Y( will be represented using definite clauses, and the set A will be represented using defeasible clauses.
Finding justifications
The interpreter will work following the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.16 taking advantage of the inference mechanism of Prolog.
The input to jf is a knowledge base ~, and a ground query Q. The contents of the knowledge base were described in Section 7.1. A ground query Q is a ground instance of an atom, possibly affected with the prefix neg. The justifier is invoked by issuing the command:
which will start the process of testing whether there is an undefeated argument which supports Q from the contents of K.
If the search finds a justification the output of the system for such a query will be one of the argument structures that are justifying Q, and all the possible defeaters that were considered. All the justifiers can be obtained by rejecting the answer, and forcing the system to keep searching.
If the answer is negative, the system will have two possible answers. The query Q has no supporting argument. Or even though arguments can be constructed to support it, all of them were defeated. In the latter case, the system will return all the potential justifiers, already defeated, with its associ-ated defeaters. We will disregard the uninteresting case when Q has no supporting argument.
The process begins by attempting to construct an argument for the given query Q. Arguments for Q are constructed by using backward chaining over the knowledge base. We will follow Shapiro's [19] terminology. A ground reduction of a goal G in a knowledge base ~ is the replacement of G by the body of a ground instance of a clause (definite or defeasible), whose head is identical to G. A defeasible inference tree consists of nodes and edges which represent the goals reduced during the construction. The root of the tree is the original query and the nodes are the goals reduced during the backward chaining. Edges represent the relation between the head of the rule used in the reduction and the atoms in the body of that rule. The backward chaining on a node G stops whenever G is supported by a unit clause, i.e., a clause like G 4, true. The following example will help to describe the process: Example 7.6. Assume the following knowledge base ~: The system will always form the most specific argument. If the system is forced to backtrack from a unit clause G ~ true, it will not attempt to find support for G in other clauses. Following those clauses will only produce a less specific argument. This observation was already suggested in the proof of Theorem 4.16.
After forming an argument, the system will try to find counterarguments for the recently formed argument by backward chaining from the negation of atoms in the original argument. Actually, the system will form a set with the atoms in the argument, and will add to that set any atom that is derivable from those atoms and the definite clauses in ~. For instance, in the example above, it will find the counterargument
{ neg flies(opus) --< penguin(opus), penguin(opus) ~ true} .
Finally, the system will test the argument and the counterargument for specificity using models of argument activation (see Simari [18] ) and models of the counterargument. In short, M is an activation model for (T, h) if M is a model of 3'f N and M is also a model for some e E Sentc(Sf ) and for the rules that form the subset T' of T such that Y{~ U {e} U T' ~ h. Using those criteria in our example, we will find that any activation model for the argument for neg flies(opus) is an activation model for the argument for flies(opus). But there is an activation model for flies(opus) which is not an activation model for neg flies(opus), namely the one where bird(opus) is true but penguin(opus) is not.
If the argument is defeated, as is the case in the example, the system will backtrack in the process that formed the original argument, discarding the last rule added to the tree, trying to replace it with another. If it finds one, the process of finding and testing defeaters is repeated. Otherwise, further backtracking is necessary. This process will continue until an undefeated argument is produced or all the backtracking possibilities are exhausted.
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a mathematical approach to defeasible reasoning. This approach is based on the notion of specificity introduced by Poole and the general theory of warrant as presented by Pollock. Poole's approach to specificity was correct but he stopped short of presenting a complete approach to it. We proved that an order relation can be introduced among equivalence classes under the equi-specificity relation. Poole did not pursue operational aspects of applying specificity. We did that here.
Pollock has suggested an operational framework for performing reasoning, but he dismissed useful and prevalent generalizations of specificity. Taking his definition of warrant, we have applied it and transformed it into a justification schema which defines the set of justified facts from a given defeasible logic structure. One result of this paper is a theorem that ensures the termination of the process of finding the justified facts. The proof of that result is based on the order relation mentioned above.
In order to implement the theoretical ideas, a suitable restriction of the language has been defined. The language used to represent the context Yg has been restricted to a subset of first-order logic, Horn clauses, and the language used to represent defeasible rules in a has been restricted in a similar way, to a Horn-clause-like syntax. The interpreter was written in Prolog, and running on top of it provides a defeasible reasoning tool for Prolog.
The implementation of the system has taken advantage of the theoretical findings. The general mechanism used in the implementation to find justifications is based on the structures built in proof of the theorem on termination. The process used to compare two argument structures for specificity is based on semantical work that is not reported here. 6 Two more lemmas (Lemmas 2.24 and 2.25) define a reduced search space. Meanwhile, it is the prospect of implementation that suggested many of these theorems.
In comparison with inheritance, this system generalizes the idea of path, clarifies the logic of reinstatement, and even in its Horn clause form, provides more expressive language. In comparison with [7] , this system shares the same spirit and many of its syntactic considerations, though reproduces almost none of the details. In particular, 5~{, A, and >-are taken from [7] , which in turn originates with Kyburg [6] . Further, [7] 's definition of arguments as digraphs confuses definitional and implementational issues, which this paper separates. In comparison with Geffner, this approach represents an alternative, older paradigm, based on arguments instead of irrelevance.
To summarize, the introduction of defeasible logic structures as a way of performing defeasible reasoning represents the unification of ideas in a formal and concise system which exhibits a correct, and uniform, behavior when applied to the benchmark examples in the literature. The investigation of the theoretical issues has aided the study of how this kind of reasoner can be realized on a computer, leading to an efficient implementation. We believe that the presentation here may have more permanence than past approaches to defeasible argument.
